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RACE, DEATH, AND THE COMPLICITOUS MIND
Justin D. Levinson*
INTRODUCTION
Despite the historical racial imbalance in capital punishment,1 inter-
disciplinary scholarship has failed to investigate fully how the human
mind may automatically and systematically facilitate racial bias
against African-American defendants in capital cases. Considered in
the legal context, well-developed social science principles may help
reveal how people's automatic and unintentional cognitive processes
may either propagate racial disparities in the death penalty or serve as
a masking agent in covering up those disparities. As social science
research continues to demonstrate the power and pervasiveness of im-
plicit racial bias in American society,2 it is important to consider how
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1. See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) [hereinafter FROM LYNCH
MOBS]; STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002); RANDALL
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997). See also Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in
Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2004) (stating that "between 1930 and 1982, African Americans
constituted between 10% and 12% of the United States population but 53% of those executed"
(citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Capital Punishment 1982, Aug. 1984, at
9)); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man's Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81
OR. L. REV. 15, 18 (2002) (noting that "the racially disproportionate application of the death
penalty can be seen as being in historical continuity with the long and sordid history of lynching
in this country").
2. See generally Brian Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Ste-
reotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (2008) [hereinafter Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and
Correlates]. See infra notes 32-89 and accompanying text. As I discuss in Part II, these biases
have been demonstrated using a variety of methodologies. The most famous of these methodol-
ogies is the Implicit Association Test. See Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009). Before implicit social cognition research became prominent, legal
scholars often referred to "unconscious" bias rather than "implicit" bias, sometimes relying upon
Freudian conceptions of the unconscious. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331-36
(1987). Legal scholarship relying upon implicit social cognition now more frequently uses the
term "implicit" to describe attitudes, memories, and stereotypes that are outside of "conscious,
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automatic and unintentional cognitive processes may foster racial bias
in the legal system.3 This Article pursues three goals related to this
endeavor: first, to introduce implicit social cognition research to
death penalty scholars and scholar advocates; second, to propose new
hypotheses that help explain why capital cases may be automatically
infused with racial bias and why research to date may cover up ex-
isting racial disparities; and third, to stimulate interdisciplinary collab-
oration and empirical examination of a wide range of social cognitive
factors in capital punishment.
Since the 1990s, social scientists have demonstrated that many
Americans harbor implicit racial biases that frequently conflict with
their self-reported racial attitudes.4 These biases manifest automati-
cally and without conscious awareness in a variety of basic circum-
attentional control." Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scien-
tific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 947 (2006); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497-1539 (2005) (explaining the foundations of scientific research on
implicit attitudes). Although the words "implicit" and "unconscious" describe similar processes,
some psychologists have cautioned against using them interchangeably. See Russell H. Fazio &
Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 303 (2003). In this Article, I generally use the term "implicit" rather
than "unconscious," except when discussing scholarship in which the authors specifically use the
term "unconscious."
3. These efforts should be combined with long-standing efforts to measure statistically overall
systemic inequalities. See, e.g., Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punish-
ment, 45 Hous. L. REV. 807, 809 (2008); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimi-
nation in the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with
Special Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194 (2003) [hereinafter Baldus &
Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty]; DAVID C. BALDUS
ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990)
[hereinafter BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE]; SAMUAL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH
AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989). See also David C.
Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment:
Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment];
Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials:
1976-1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1995); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PEN-
ALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PAITERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (GAO/GGD-90-
57, Feb. 1990).
4. See Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF REMEM-
BERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds.,
2001) [hereinafter Banaji, Implicit Attitudes]; Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group
Attitudes and Beliefs From a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes]; Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring
Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) [hereinafter Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences];
Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem,
and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 15 (1995).
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stances, such as when people categorize information,5 remember
facts, 6 and make decisions.7 Furthermore, these automatic cognitive
processes work predictably and powerfully despite conflicting with
people's frequently egalitarian reports of their own racial attitudes.8
As legal scholars have become more aware of these powerful biases
and their implications for law and society, many have argued that the
new empirical understanding of discrimination warrants shifting legal
regimes.9 Legal scholarship in a variety of areas now thoughtfully in-
corporates knowledge on implicit bias into disciplines such as employ-
ment law,10 communication law,11 affirmative action, 12 and legal
5. See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 181 (2001)
(finding that people can more quickly identify guns after having seen, but not noticed, flashing
photos of Black people); Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Acti-
vation and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 510
(1991) (finding that simply seeing a member of a certain ethnic group can influence stereotype-
driven word completion tasks); Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences, supra note 4,
at 1474 (showing that people are faster at grouping together, for example, Black names with
negative words than with positive words, relative to White names); Nosek et al., Pervasiveness
and Correlates, supra note 2 (reviewing the results of hundreds of thousands of these tests taken
on Project Implicit's website and elsewhere).
6. See generally Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking,
and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality]
(reviewing several of these studies and exploring how memory biases may function in legal deci-
sion making); Alison P. Lenton et al., Illusions of Gender: Stereotypes Evoke False Memories, 37
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (2001). See also C. Neil Macrae et al., Creating Memory
Illusions: Expectancy-Based Processing and the Generation of False Memories, 10 MEMORY 63,
64 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Asso-
ciation Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 368 (2007).
8. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1505 n.70 (explaining research on this process of "dissociation"
(citing Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Compo-
nents, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1989))).
9. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrim-
ination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1007 (2006); Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 348; Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 236-57 (2005); Kang, supra
note 2, at 1493-97. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1995). But see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the
Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1028, 1032-33 (2006) (arguing for caution in as-
suming that the results of the implicit association test apply in legal contexts).
10. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Em-
ployment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481 (2005); Ann C. McGinley,
!Viva La Evoluci6n: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII. 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 415 (2000); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913 (1999)
(arguing for a qualified evidentiary privilege to encourage unconscious-bias testing).
11. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1539-89.
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decision making.13 Despite this meaningful progress, legal scholars in
other areas have yet to examine how stereotype-driven cognitive
processes may affect a broad range of laws and legal processes. 14 In-
terdisciplinary work identifying how law itself propagates bias is even
rarer.15 One area of discourse in particular need of exploration is
death penalty scholarship. 16
Social cognition theory17 can help generate new hypotheses relating
to race and capital punishment.' 8 This Article presents and develops
two preliminary hypotheses that apply social cognition theory to the
capital context: (1) Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, which posits
that the supposedly race-neutral death qualification of jurors uninten-
tionally and automatically elicits implicit racial bias in the final jury
panel, and (2) Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis, which proposes that
complex empirical studies examining race and the death penalty may
unintentionally cover up racial bias because they rely on racially bi-
ased case facts.
12. See generally Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revi-
sion of "Affirmative Action," 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006).
13. See generally Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6; Page, supra note 9.
14. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1536-38 (describing a broad range of legal areas for future
research). Similarly, scholars who have already incorporated an understanding of implicit social
cognition should seek to tighten the nexus between the legal principles and scientific phenomena
they discuss.
15. See generally Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Ju-
ries: How "Legal Priming" Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059
(2005) [hereinafter Levinson, Suppressing Community Values]; Kang, supra note 2, at 1592 (chal-
lenging the FCC's policies encouraging more local news).
16. In the 2004 Race to Execution Symposium at DePaul University College of Law, Theodore
Eisenberg and Sheri Lynn Johnson began the examination of implicit racial attitudes in the con-
text of the death penalty, and found that capital defense lawyers display implicit racial bias.
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1556 (2004).
17. Generally, the field of social cognition studies how people think about themselves and
others, "often using methods from cognitive psychology to investigate how the human mind
works." Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 354 (citing SUSAN T. FISKE &
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 2, 19 (2d ed. 1991)).
18. These new hypotheses, which focus on the automatic and often unintentional nature of
discrimination, are part of a broader effort to recognize the shared cultural responsibility for the
continuing racial disparities in criminal justice and beyond. See Charles Lawrence III, Uncon-
scious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of "The Id, The Ego, and Equal
Protection," 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 959-60 (2008) (arguing that if scholars focus narrowly on
automatic cognitive processes, there is a risk that such scholarship will minimize cultural and
individual responsibility for racism); see also Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6,
at 417-18 (acknowledging that the only permanent solution for implicit racial biases is cultural
change). The hypotheses I present provide potential pathways for understanding how a culture
that has always discriminated has continued to do so in ways that are perhaps just as dangerous
but are now harder to detect. If these hypotheses are confirmed, they would not only call into
question the continued use of capital punishment, but also would reflect a discriminatory race-
based cultural ideology that has infected legal processes. See generally Lawrence, supra note 2.
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Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis proposes that the death qualifi-
cation process elicits implicit racial biases in most capital jurors. This
hypothesis is based on the social cognition concept of priming, a phe-
nomenon that explains how even seemingly race-neutral conversa-
tions can elicit automatically racially biased cognitive processes in
jurors. This automatic activation results from both deep historical as-
sociations between capital punishment and race and the continuing
propagation of racial stereotypes in the media and American culture
generally.
Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis posits that influential studies ex-
amining racial bias in the death penalty have unintentionally covered
up racial bias against African-American defendants because these
studies rely upon sources of case information that are tainted by im-
plicit bias. Social cognition studies have demonstrated that people
store and retrieve information in stereotype-driven ways,19 and that
transmission of information from one source to another can uninten-
tionally transform a non-biased story into a racially biased one.20 As a
result of the unintentional fact-based errors that occur when racial ste-
reotypes are present, even the most thoughtful and complex empirical
studies on race and capital punishment may use statistical techniques
that unintentionally mask racial bias.
Part II first introduces the science of social cognition and provides
several specific examples of empirical studies that explain how the
human mind automatically facilitates racially biased decision mak-
ing.21 In order to contextualize how these unintentional biases affect
legal discourse, Part II next describes how scholars in a variety of ar-
eas outside the death penalty arena have explored the close connec-
tion between implicit bias and the law.22 Part III builds upon this
prior research in social cognition and the law, and introduces two new
hypotheses: Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis 23 and Racial Bias
Masking Hypothesis. 24 These hypotheses, although preliminary and
still in need of empirical exploration, examine first how the death
qualification process may itself bias capital jurors against African-
American defendants, and second, how implicit biases that affect the
perception, description, and later recording of case facts may serve to
cover up disparities based on the defendant's race. Part IV briefly
19. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 376-78 (describing this process).
20. See GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 65-68 (Rus-
sell & Russell 1965) (1947).
21. See infra notes 26-89 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 90-134 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 135-219 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 220-273 and accompanying text.
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discusses potential pathways for further exploration and concludes
that focused interdisciplinary collaboration will provide the most
meaningful path for progress in understanding the complexities of
race and the death penalty.2 5
II. IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNIION OUTSIDE AND INSIDE OF LAW
Understanding how people process and store information, catego-
rize data, and make decisions is central to understanding decision
making in any legal context. In capital cases, little is known about the
cognitive processes whereby prosecutors, judges, and jurors make de-
cisions. 26 In particular, very little is known about how attorneys',
judges', and jurors' automatic and unintentional cognitive processes
influence the way they think about case facts, defendants, aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, verdict, and punishment.27 Investigat-
25. See infra notes 274-277 and accompanying text.
26. There have been quite a few studies of decision making in the death penalty setting, but
these studies tend not to have focused on implicit cognitions. See, e.g., Robert M. Bohm, Capital
Punishment in Two Judicial Circuits in Georgia: A Description of the Key Actors and the Deci-
sion-Making Process, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1994); Sally Costanzo & Mark Costanzo,
Life or Death Decisions: An Analysis of Capital Jury Decision Making Under the Special Issues
Sentencing Framework, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1994); see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Race and
the Victim: An Examination of Capital Sentencing and Guilt Attribution Studies, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 533 (1998) (describing a variety of studies both in capital and non-capital contexts).
27. Several legal scholars have alluded generally to the ways in which "subconscious" or "un-
conscious" biases may affect various aspects of capital trials. Most of these projects, however, do
not explicitly connect psychological theory and research to their claims. As discussed in Part IV
infra, these articles might be a good place to start when initiating empirical interdisciplinary
collaborations. See, e.g., Lucy Adams, Comment, Death by Discretion: Who Decides Who Lives
and Dies in the United States of America?, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 381, 389-90 (2005) (stating "a
white prosecutor may-consciously or subconsciously-perceive a crime to be more 'outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman' if it is alleged to have been committed against a
white victim, and if the outrage of the community and its desire for vengeance is palpable");
Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth
Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2083, 2094-2106 (2004) (reviewing several areas where unconscious discrimina-
tion may manifest, including the extreme deference give to prosecutors); Rory K. Little, What
Federal Prosecutors Really Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt,
and the Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591, 1599-1600 (2004) (considering
the "unconscious race empathy" that white prosecutors might have with white defendants or
white victims); Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective
Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARv. BLACKLErTER L.J. 127, 140-41
(2003) (proposing that it "is likely that unconscious racism influences a prosecutor even more
than it affects others."); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of
the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1819 (1998) (alluding to unconscious biases
produced due to similarities between prosecutors and victims); see also Stephen B. Bright, Will
the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: International Norms, Discrimina-
tion, Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1, 12-15; Angela J.
Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13,
18 (1998); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
2009] RACE, DEATH, AND THE COMPLICITOUS MIND 605
ing the connection between social cognition and legal decision making
is important in any legal case, but the stakes make it crucial in capital
cases. Although there are few efforts to connect implicit social cogni-
tion and the death penalty,28 other legal scholarship can inform a so-
cial cognition based critique of the death penalty.
This Part first discusses a selected few social cognition projects that
may not be known to death penalty scholars and scholar-advocates. 29
Beyond the two hypotheses proposed in this Article, understanding
social cognition research may help death penalty scholars and scholar-
advocates generate their own hypotheses. 30 The empirical studies de-
scribed in this Part underscore two basic themes of implicit social cog-
nition: first, the human mind makes unintentional, but powerful and
biased, associations based on gender, race, and ethnicity; and second,
these automatic associations are meaningful, and influence decision
making and behavior. After describing these studies, this Part turns to
existing legal scholarship on social cognition, highlighting legal schol-
arly work that may serve to stimulate theory development and collab-
oration in the capital context.31 These legal-theory-based projects
demonstrate that understanding the workings of the human mind is an
important ingredient in achieving justice.
A. Automatic Associations, Bias, and the Human Mind
Implicit social cognition researchers investigate how cognitive
processes operate "without conscious awareness or conscious control
but nevertheless influence fundamental evaluations of individuals or
groups. ' 32 As Anthony Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger de-
scribe, "the science of implicit cognition suggests that actors do not
always have conscious, intentional control over the processes of social
perception, impression formation, and judgment that motivate their
1016, 1016-17 (1988). See generally Julian A. Cook, Jr. & Mark S. Kende, Color-blindness in the
Rehnquist Court: Comparing the Court's Treatment of Discrimination Claims by a Black Death
Row Inmate and White Voting Rights Plaintiffs, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 815 (1996).
28. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 16, at 1556.
29. For detailed summaries of scholarship discussing implicit bias and the law, see Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6; Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1073-75 (reviewing
studies that document racial bias in hiring behavior and medical diagnoses); Kristin A. Lane et
al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 427,444 (2007) (summarizing
scholarship in implicit social cognition). See generally Kang, supra note 2; Christine Jolls & Cass
R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006).
30. For more on scholar advocates and political lawyers, see Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race
Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 821, 833-34 (1997).
31. See infra notes 90-134 and accompanying text.
32. Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1064; see also Fazio & Olson, supra note 2.
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actions. '33 In the 1990s, social scientists began to discover more fully
the complex pattern of automatic cognitive networks that people har-
bor. To learn how these networks function systematically, predictably,
and largely outside of people's conscious awareness, psychologists de-
vised and tested several different valid methodologies. This Section
briefly describes a few of the reliable ways that social scientists have
measured people's implicit 34 cognitions. 35 These studies show first
that people harbor automatic attitudes and racial stereotypes that fre-
quently deviate from their explicitly stated beliefs and, second, that
these implicit associations and stereotypes predict people's behavior.36
1. Ease of Stereotype Activation: Word Games and Identifying
Objects
Researchers have demonstrated the ease and power of stereotype
activation by showing how simply seeing a stereotyped group member
can activate a person's negative ethnic stereotypes related to that
group.37 In one simple and elegant study, participants watched a
video in which a research assistant held cue cards containing word
fragments. 38 All participants watched identical videos, except that
half of the participants saw a video in which the research assistant was
Asian and half of the participants saw a video in which the research
assistant was Caucasian. 39 In the video, the assistant held cue cards
containing incomplete words, including words that were potentially
stereotypic of Asians, such as "RIE," "POLIE," "SORT," and
"SY." ' 40 Participants were asked to generate as many word comple-
tions as possible for each card during a fifteen-second period.41 Re-
sults of the study showed that simply seeing an Asian research
assistant was enough to activate ethnic stereotypes of Asians. Partici-
pants who watched a videotape with an Asian assistant completed
33. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 2, at 946.
34. See Fazio & Olson, supra note 2, at 303 & n.1 (discussing the inexact use of the terms
"implicit" and "unconscious" in social science literature, and suggesting that scientists might
instead use the term "indirect").
35. See infra notes 37-89 and accompanying text.
36. See Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 368-69.
37. See Gilbert & Hixon, supra note 5. As Gilbert and Hixon point out, "[sitereotypes are
forms of information and, as such, are thought to be stored in memory in a dormant state until
they are activated for use." Id. at 509.
38. Id. at 510.
39. Id.
40. Id. The stereotyped completions of these words were RICE, POLITE, SHORT, AND
SHY.
41. Id.
[Vol. 58:599
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more stereotype words than participants who watched a videotape
with a Caucasian assistant.42
Racial stereotypes, similar to the ones in the word completion
study, can be activated in just milliseconds.43 Furthermore, research
demonstrates that even lightning-fast stereotype activation affects task
performance in racially biased ways.44 A study by Keith Payne ex-
amined how merely showing participants a photograph of a White or
Black face for 200 milliseconds could affect the speed at which they
could subsequently identify weapons.45 In the study, Payne showed
participants photos of Black or White faces followed immediately by
photos of objects.46 The participants' only task, Payne told them, was
to identify the objects as quickly as possible when they were displayed
on the screen.47 Payne also told participants that the flashing photo-
graph of faces only served to alert the participant that a photograph of
an object was about to appear.48 Results of the study demonstrated
that when participants saw photos of Black faces immediately before
photos of guns, they were significantly faster at identifying the guns
than when they saw photos of White faces before photos of guns.4 9
Similarly, when participants saw photos of White faces immediately
before photos of tools, they were significantly faster at identifying the
tools than when they saw photos of Black faces before photos of
tools. 50 In a follow-up study that measured the participants' error
rates rather than response speed when a time deadline was imposed,
Payne found that participants who saw Black faces before photos of
tools were more likely to misclassify the tools as guns compared to
participants who saw White faces before photos of tools. 51 Taken to-
gether, Payne's studies show that racial stereotypes can be elicited au-
tomatically in a number of milliseconds, and that these stereotypes
can affect the speed and accuracy of meaningful object classification
tasks.
42. Id. In this study, the researchers also tested how cognitive busyness affects stereotype
activation. The comparison reported above (for purposes of simplicity in describing the concept
of stereotype activation) only focuses on participants in the non-cognitive busyness condition.
Interestingly, the researchers found that cognitive busyness inhibits stereotype activation, but
increases its application once it has been activated. Id. at 512.
43. Payne, supra note 5.
44. Id. at 184-85.
45. Id. at 184.
46. Id.
47. Id. The objects consisted of guns and non-gun objects (the non-gun objects were hand
tools, such as a socket wrench and an electric drill).
48. ld.
49. Payne, supra note 5, at 185.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 189.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
2. Stereotype Primes: Test Taking, Walking Speed, and Beyond
Similar to the studies on stereotype activation, priming studies
demonstrate the simplicity and power of stereotypes on decision mak-
ing. Priming describes "the incidental activation of knowledge struc-
tures, such as trait concepts and stereotypes, by the current situational
context.152 Simply put, priming studies show how causing someone to
think about a particular domain can trigger associative networks re-
lated to that domain. 53 Activating these associative networks, which
can include stereotypes, can affect people's decision making and be-
havior, often without their conscious awareness.
Some of the most famous priming experiments have studied the ef-
fect of racial, ethnic, and gender stereotypes on students' test-taking
performance. For example, Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson first
identified the concept of "stereotype threat" by priming college stu-
dents in test-taking situations. 54 Steele and Aronson primed Cauca-
sian and African-American college students by asking them to identify
their race just before they took a test.55 The researchers found that
such a simple priming task had profound effects on African Ameri-
cans' test performance. African-American participants took longer to
answer questions and achieved lower overall scores relative to Cauca-
sian participants, but only when they were primed. 56 Thus, Steele and
Aronson found that priming a participant's racial constructs related to
the self likely implicated a complex relationship between African-
American identity and negative stereotypes relating to ability. They
called this phenomenon "stereotype threat."
In a related study, Steele and Aronson found that stereotype threat
could be elicited even by indirectly priming the racial stereotype. 57 In
this study, when they told half of the participants that the test results
would be used to evaluate performance but did not ask participants to
identify their race, they found results similar to those obtained when
they primed race directly: African-American students in the indirect
prime condition performed worse than Caucasian students in the same
condition, whereas African-American and Caucasian students per-
52. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and
Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 230 (1996).
53. Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, which is introduced and discussed, infra Part Ill, relies
upon the concept of priming to explain how death qualification automatically primes racial ste-
reotypes related to the death penalty. See infra notes 135-219 and accompanying text.
54. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Perform-
ance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 799 (1995).
55. Id. at 806.
56. Id. at 807.
57. Id. at 799.
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formed similarly in the non-prime condition.58 This study demon-
strates the ease and influence of indirect racial priming. Simply
priming a non-explicit but related stereotype, even without mention-
ing race, can cause profound results. Although it would not be intui-
tive to many that using race-neutral concepts can elicit powerful racial
stereotypes, social cognition research shows that priming can occur as
long as historical, cultural, or popular associations connect the concept
with a racial stereotype. In the case of stereotype threat, African-
American student participants associated the evaluation instruction as
implicating stereotypes relating to African Americans and intellectual
ability. Similarly, Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, which is intro-
duced in Part III, relies upon the concept of indirect priming to argue
that death qualification primes racial stereotypes and biases.5
9
In a fascinating study that showed how non-conscious and indirect
priming of stereotypes can affect seemingly unrelated behavior, John
Bargh and his colleagues found that participants actually walked more
slowly after being subliminally primed with stereotypes of the eld-
erly.60 In this study, participants performed a scrambled-sentence task
that asked them to read groups of words and form their own sentences
using those words.61 Half of the participants in the study read word
groupings that consisted of neutral words mixed with words associated
with the elderly, such as "worried," "wise," "stubborn," "helpless,"
and "bingo."' 62 The other half of participants read word groupings un-
associated with elderly, such as "thirsty," "clean," and "private.
63
After completing the sentence-creation task, participants were told
they had completed the study, thanked for their participation, and di-
rected to exit through a bank of elevators down the hall.64 As soon as
participants exited the room, a confederate of the experimenter
started a hidden stopwatch and timed the amount of time it took for
the participants to walk the length of the corridor, ending at a strip of
tape placed on the floor nine-and-three-quarter meters from the start-
ing point.65
58. Id. at 801.
59. See infra notes 135-219 and accompanying text.
60. Bargh et al., supra note 52, at 237.
61. Id. at 236 (citing T.K. Srull & R.S. Wyer, The Role of Category Accessibility in the Interpre-
tation of Information about Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1660 (1979)).
62. Id. Note that words related to slowness were not used in the study.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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As predicted, the study's results indicated that participants who had
been primed with elderly stereotype words took longer to walk down
the hall compared to participants who had been primed with neutral
words.66 Furthermore, participants in the elderly word prime condi-
tion reported almost no awareness of the stereotyped content of the
sentence creation task.67 This study builds upon the Steele and Aron-
son study by employing a different type of indirect priming and mea-
suring its impact on a novel behavior. Here, merely seeing themed
but otherwise neutral words such as "wise," "worried," and "bingo,"
affected participants' own behavior, even without awareness of the
stereotype activation. Generally, these priming studies highlight the
susceptibility of the human mind to the interference of both direct and
indirect stereotypes. In the legal setting, it should not be surprising if
stereotype primes are frequently activated or if legal processes them-
selves act as primes. 68
3. Reaction Time Measures: The Implicit Association Test
Thus far, this Section has explained the ease of automatically acti-
vating stereotypes and described how stereotypes, whether directly or
indirectly primed, can influence a broad range of decisions. The de-
scribed studies are similar because they all activate implicit constructs,
such as stereotypes, and measure the effects of this activation. They
are different because scientists measure how the implicit constructs
manifest in different ways: in identifying language, in academic test
performance, and in walking speed. Each of these studies shows the
dynamic nature of implicit cognitive processes-processes that are im-
portant components of human decision making.
Within legal discourse, the most frequently discussed example of
implicit social cognition is the Implicit Association Test (IAT). 69 As
described elsewhere, the IAT
66. Bargh et al., supra note 52, at 237.
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 135-219 and accompanying text. See generally Levinson, Suppressing
Community Values, supra note 15 (arguing that simply placing citizens on juries automatically
changes the way they think and make decisions).
69. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psy-
chology, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1241, 1250, 1269-70 (2002); Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality,
supra note 6, at 356; Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 2, at 952-56; Kang & Banaji, supra note
12, at 1072; Page, supra note 9, at 237-38. See generally Kang, supra note 2 (thoroughly discuss-
ing the IAT and other implicit social cognition studies); Reshma M. Saujani, "The Implicit Asso-
ciation Test": A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 395 (2003). The IAT is not the only meaningful reaction time measure. Another
important line of studies measured reaction times in the shoot/no-shoot decisions of participants.
In these studies, often called "shooter bias" studies, participants typically participated in a video-
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pairs an attitude object (such as a racial group) with an evaluative
dimension (good or bad) and tests how response accuracy and speed
indicate implicit and automatic attitudes and stereotypes. In the
computerized version of the IAT, participants sit at a computer and
keyboard and are asked to pair an attitude object (for example,
Black or White, man or woman, fat or thin) with either an evalua-
tive dimension (for example, good or bad) or an attribute dimension
(for example, home or career, science or arts) by pressing a re-
sponse key as quickly as they can. For example, in one task, partici-
pants are told to quickly pair together pictures of African-American
faces with positive words from the evaluative dimension. The speed
at which the participants can pair the words together signifies the
strength of the attitude (or in the case of attributes, the strength of
the stereotype). 70
Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald summarize, "when
highly associated targets and attributes share the same response key,
participants tend to classify them quickly and easily, whereas when
weakly associated targets and attributes share the same response key,
participants tend to classify them more slowly and with greater diffi-
culty. ' 71 Laurie Rudman and Richard Ashmore add, "The inge-
niously simple concept underlying the IAT is that tasks are performed
well when they rely on well-practiced associations between objects
and attributes. '72
Scores of studies have found that people harbor implicit associa-
tions that are biased against stereotyped group members.73 According
game-like experience, where they were told to shoot when they saw a person with a gun, but hit
the safety button when they saw a person with no weapon. These studies frequently showed that
participants were faster to pull the trigger when the armed person was Black and that partici-
pants were faster to hit the safety when the unarmed person was White. Participants also typi-
cally made more errors by "shooting" when the unarmed person was Black relative to White.
See Joshua Correll et al., Event-Related Potentials and the Decision to Shoot: The Role of Threat
Perception and Cognitive Control, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 122 (2006); Joshua
Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threat-
ening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1321 (2002); Payne, supra note 5,
at 185-86. Other authors have described shooter bias in more detail. See Levinson, Forgotten
Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 356-61; Kang, supra note 2, at 1525-28. Other reaction time
studies, such as the Go-NoGo Association Task (GNAT) are conceptually similar to the IAT, but
were designed for greater flexibility. See Brian A. Nosek & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Go/No-Go
Association Task, 19 Soc. COGNITION 625, 625 (2001).
70. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 355 (citing Greenwald & Banaji,
supra note 4, at 14-19, 14-19); Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 4, at 123-24; Greenwald et
al., Measuring Individual Differences, supra note 4, at 1466.
71. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 355 (quoting Nilanjana Dasgupta &
Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic
Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 800, 803 (2001)).
72. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 359.
73. See Anthony Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III.
Meta Analysis of Predictive Validity, J. PERSONALInY & SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2009)
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to Brian Nosek and his colleagues, who reviewed hundreds of
thousands of IATs taken on the Project Implicit website and else-
where, the IAT has consistently shown that a majority of test takers
exhibit implicit racial bias 74-and other, non-racial biases-on a vari-
ety of measures. 75 For example, sixty-eight percent of participants
demonstrated an implicit preference for "White people" versus
"Black people" (or "light skin" versus "dark skin"), 76 seventy-five
percent of participants showed an implicit preference for "pro-abled
people" versus "disabled people," 77 and sixty-nine percent of partici-
pants showed an implicit preference for "thin people" versus "fat
people. 78
IAT results are both compelling and meaningful. Research has
found that implicit associations and stereotypes, measured by the IAT,
predict discriminatory decision making and behavior.79 For example,
a 2007 study by Rudman and Ashmore tested whether the IAT pre-
dicted discrimination in economic decision making.80 In that study,
student participants first took a series of IAT tests, including those
testing negative stereotypes related to Jews (relative to Christians)
and Asians (relative to Whites). 81 On a separate occasion, the same
participants completed a survey designed to test economic discrimina-
tion.8 2 Participants were told that their input was needed in determin-
ing how to administer a mandatory twenty percent budget cut to
university student organizations. 83 They were then provided a list of
current student organizations along with funding levels, and were
asked to allocate the new budget across the various groups. 84 The re-
searchers then compared participant IAT scores with recommended
budget cuts. 85 The results of the study showed that scores on the ster-
[hereinafter Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using] (including over 100 studies in the meta-
analysis); Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates, supra note 2.
74. In implicit social cognition, the word "bias" means "a displacement of people's responses
along a continuum of possible judgments." Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 2, at 950. "Re-
sponse bias need not indicate something unwise, inappropriate, or even inaccurate." Id.
75. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates, supra note 2.
76. Id. at 17. These results aggregated IATs testing Black versus White and Dark Skin versus
Light Skin.
77. Id. at 19.
78. Id.
79. Rudman & Ashiore, supra note 7, at 359. See generally Greenwald et al., Understanding
and Using, supra note 73.
80. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 363.
81. Id. at 363-64.
82. Participants had no reason to believe that the two studies were connected. Id. at 364-65.
83. Id. at 364.
84. Id. at 365.
85. Id.
[Vol. 58:599
2009] RACE, DEATH, AND THE COMPLICITOUS MIND 613
eotype IAT predicted economic discrimination.86 Specifically, "peo-
ple who associated minority group members with negative attributes
and majority group members with positive attributes were also likely
to recommend budget cuts for the target minority group's student or-
ganization. '87 Rudman and Ashmore's study adds to the literature
demonstrating the connection between implicit racial bias and biased
decision making and behavior. A meta-analysis of IAT studies con-
cluded that IAT scores predicted a variety of behaviors, such as vot-
ing, consumer choice, and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores. 88
The meta-analysis also found that when measuring prejudice and ste-
reotypes, the IAT, compared to self reports, served as a better predic-
tor of hiring decisions, verbal and non-verbal pro-social indicators,
and other behaviors. 89 Taken together, these studies demonstrate the
importance of investigating the connection between implicit cognitive
processes and legal decision making.
B. Legal Applications of Implicit Bias Research
Legal scholars have begun to incorporate research on implicit social
cognition into legal discourse. Since the 1990s, scholars have dis-
cussed social cognition work in several areas of legal discourse, with
employment discrimination law emerging as the most frequent venue
for discussions of implicit racial bias and implicit gender bias. This
Section describes some of the more focused examples of scholarship
linking social cognition and law, with the purpose of orienting a non-
interdisciplinary audience to the breadth of this discourse. 90 Before
doing so, however, it must be acknowledged that based upon the nu-
merous areas of law where social cognition theory has yet to be ex-
plored, this emerging interdisciplinary work remains in its infancy.91
86. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 368.
87. Id. at 367.
88. Id. at 360 (citing T.A. Poehlman et al., Measuring and Using the Implicit Association Test:
III. Meta-analysis of Predictive Validity (unpublished manuscript, 2004)); see also Greenwald &
Krieger, supra note 2, at 954 (discussing Poehlman and colleagues' meta-analysis and the IAT's
predictive validity generally).
89. Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 7, at 360.
90. See infra notes 92-134 and accompanying text.
91. In various instances, courts have discussed implicit racial bias with a level of sophistica-
tion. See, e.g., Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 905-08 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Law review
articles have discussed this element of the Chin case. See Darren Seiji Teshima, A "Hardy Hand-
shake Sort of Guy": The Model Minority and Implicit Bias About Asian Americans in Chin v.
Runnels, 11 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 122 (2006); Sara R. Benson, Reviving the Disparate
Impact Doctrine to Combat Unconscious Discrimination: A Study of Chin v. Runnels, 31 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 61 (2005). Despite the progress seen in individual cases like Chin, for
the most part courts have been hesitant to rely upon this research in published decisions. See
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Employment law scholarship on implicit bias shows how established
legal principles must be reexamined when new social science evidence
conflicts with the law. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits intentional discrimination in the workplace. 92 Under
the "disparate treatment" branch of Title VII analysis, an employee or
potential employee claiming discrimination must demonstrate that the
employer intended to discriminate based upon the employee's group
membership. 93 Proving such intent to discriminate was never easy,
but it has become harder as the nature of discrimination has
changed. 94 Finding evidence that an employer made discriminatory
remarks or wrote biased notes in a written employment evaluation,
for example, has become rarer and rarer. Until the 1990s, however,
the subjective intent standard in employment discrimination largely
remained unchallenged based upon psychological reality. With the
emergence of social cognition research, a compelling number of schol-
ars have recognized that implicit bias, which many of these scholars
term "unconscious" discrimination, 95 likely operates in a variety of
employment contexts. Although courtroom arguments of implicit bias
have been met with mixed results, 96 scholars have increasingly called
for a judicial recognition of implicit bias in the employment context.97
Linda Hamilton Krieger, for example, argued that the intent standard
should be changed to a causation standard.98
Scholars have examined other areas of the law in light of social cog-
nition theory, although with less frequency compared to employment
discrimination law. Discourse on legal decision making has, for exam-
ple, examined how attorneys, judges, and juries may unintentionally
make a variety of decisions in racially biased ways. 99 I have previously
infra notes 129-133 and accompanying text (discussing a New Hampshire court's rejection of a
fair trial motion based on Banaji's testimony).
92. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 9, at 1009.
93. Id. at 1009-10.
94. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 9 (arguing that Title VII jurisprudence constructs discrimina-
tion inadequately to address subtle, often unconscious, forms of bias).
95. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 10, at 483.
96. Kee Campbell, Inferring Implicit Bias: Not Necessarily a Leap of Faith (May 1, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
97. Several employment discrimination scholars have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Tristin K.
Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623 (2005); Hart, supra note 10; Lee,
supra note 10; Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013 (2004); McGinley, supra note 10; Pollard, supra note 10 (encouraging
testing for unconscious bias in the employment context); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Acci-
dent, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999).
98. Krieger, supra note 9, at 1242.
99. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 347. See generally Page, supra
note 9.
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argued that judges and jurors automatically misremember case facts in
racially biased ways. 1°° When case facts are consistent with judges'
and jurors' explicit or implicit racial stereotypes-for example, the
stereotype that African Americans are aggressive-these judges and
jurors will find it easier to remember facts that are consistent with
these stereotypes. 101 To test this hypothesis, I conducted a simple em-
pirical study designed to examine whether people misremember stere-
otype-consistent case facts in racially biased ways. 102 In the study,
participants read about a physical altercation that occurred after a bar
confrontation.1 0 3 All participants read the same facts, although some
read about an African-American actor, others read about a Native
Hawaiian actor, and still others read about a Caucasian actor.104 Af-
ter reading the story and being distracted by a short task, participants
were asked to identify whether certain facts had appeared in the story
they read. 10 5 Results of the study indicated that participants who read
about an African-American actor remembered that actor's aggressive
actions more frequently than participants who read about a Caucasian
actor.1 06
Other scholars have focused on how implicit bias may affect attor-
ney decision making during jury selection. Because of the importance
of jury selection in capital cases, these projects have direct relevance
to death penalty scholarship. In an article that examined how attor-
neys use peremptory challenges, Antony Page argued that the per-
emptory challenge process provides a ready forum for implicit bias to
manifest. 10 7 Page posited that even well-intentioned attorneys may
use their peremptory challenges in implicitly biased ways. 108 An em-
pirical study by Samuel Sommers and Michael Norton tested a similar
hypothesis and found that study participants who acted as lawyers
consistently made race-neutral explanations for striking jurors even
when the study was designed so that the only difference between po-
tential jurors was race.109 Adding credibility to these two projects in
100. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 350.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 394-95.
103. Id. at 394.
104. Id. Participants were randomly assigned to the three different conditions based on ac-
tor's race. The race of these actors was identified explicitly in the stories. Id. at 394-95.
105. Id. at 350.
106. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 350.
107. See Page, supra note 9, at 160.
108. Id.
109. Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifica-
tions: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 261, 269 (2007).
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the area of capital cases, an empirical study by Theodore Eisenberg
and Sheri Lynn Johnson found that even capital defense attorneys, a
group of people who would be expected to resist racial bias, systemati-
cally displayed implicit racial bias when they took race IATs.110
One of the first major projects exploring implicit social cognition
and law together examined the potentially harmful effects of Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) policies that favored local news
broadcasts.1"1 After outlining the FCC policies favoring local news as
part of the "public interest," Jerry Kang connected these policies to
implicit racial bias, and argued that local news acts as a "Trojan
Horse" that spreads biases rapidly to unsuspecting viewers. 112 Kang
meticulously linked this claim to implicit social cognition, and intro-
duced legal scholars to studies psychologists had been developing over
the previous decade."1 3 Recognizing that the impact of social cogni-
tion spreads beyond communication law, Kang called for broad re-
search agendas incorporating social cognition into law and policy, as
well as for increasing interdisciplinary collaborations. 1 4
Kang later joined Mahzarin Banaji, one of the creators of the IAT,
to provide new perspective on the affirmative action debate. 15 Re-
casting the affirmative action debate in terms of implicit bias and a
concept they called "behavioral realism," 116 Kang and Banaji argued
that the pervasive nature of implicit biases demonstrates that inequal-
ity is alive and well. Relying upon a wide range of studies in implicit
social cognition, Kang and Banaji claimed that taking "fair measures"
(a term they preferred to use instead of "affirmative action") might
one day help to disable the powerful effects of implicit racial bias in
society.117 For example, one "fair measure" would be to hire more
"countertypical exemplars," people who are typically under-
represented in certain positions." 8 Hiring a countertypical exemplar
might mean hiring a female construction worker or a male nurse. 119
Kang and Banaji specifically connected their suggested fair measures
110. Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 16, at 1556.
111. Kang, supra note 2, at 1497.
112. Id. at 1553-54.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1536-39, 1591-92.
115. Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1065.
116. According to Kang, "behavioral realism" refers to "a new school of thought" in which
"legal analysts, social cognitionists [and more] ... cooperate to deepen our understanding of
human behavior generally and racial mechanics specifically, with an eye toward practical solu-
tions." Kang, supra note 2, at 1591-92.
117. Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1078.
118. Id. at 1105.
119. Id. at 1109.
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with implicit social cognition research on "debiasing.' 'a20 Research
has shown that exposing people to countertypical exemplars can at
least temporarily reduce implicit bias.' 21
Scholars of the death penalty have sometimes discussed the ways in
which implicit bias might manifest in capital cases.122 Although these
projects typically have not specifically connected implicit bias to deci-
sion making in death penalty cases, they have proposed a variety of
hypotheses worthy of investigation. Specifically, there appears to be a
convergence of interest among commentators that focuses on prosecu-
tors as perpetrators of biased decision making. Jeffrey Pokorak, Rory
Little, Scott Howe, Lucy Adams, and Yoav Sapir have all asserted that
implicit biases among prosecutors may lead to racial disparities in cap-
ital cases. 123 Specifically, Pokorak claimed that similarities between
prosecutors and victims may lead to unconscious bias and racially dis-
proportionate prosecutorial decisions. 124 Little termed this similarity
between prosecutors and victims "unconscious race empathy."'1 25
Howe pointed out that extreme deference to prosecutors heightens
the stakes for prosecutors' unconscious biases.' 26 Adams asserted that
prosecutors' judgments of aggravating factors may specifically relate
to prosecutors' unconscious biases. 127 Finally, Sapir argued that un-
conscious bias likely affects prosecutors even more than others. 128
These scholars and others have generated meaningful hypotheses re-
lating to implicit bias and the death penalty. The next step, as Kang
and others have argued more generally, is for interdisciplinary collab-
orations to empirically examine their claims.
Despite the early stage of research combining social cognition and
death penalty discourse, one indicator of interdisciplinary progress in
capital cases has been expert witness testimony on the IAT and its
possible effects in capital trials. In a 2008 New Hamphire pre-trial
hearing, Banaji testified that implicit racial bias might make it impos-
sible for a Black defendant (who, in that case, was accused of murder-
120. Id. at 1111. Debiasing refers to the process of using interventions to reduce or eliminate
implicit biases. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 345-46; see also Kang,
supra note 2, at 121; Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1111.
121. See Kang, supra note 2, at 1561.
122. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
123. Most of these commentators use the word "unconscious" to describe the bias.
124. Pokorak, supra note 27, at 1819.
125. Little, supra note 27, at 1599-1600.
126. Howe, supra note 27, at 2096.
127. Adams, supra note 27, at 389-90.
128. Sapir, supra note 27, at 140.
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ing a White police officer) to receive a fair trial. 129 According to a
newspaper account of the testimony, "Judge Kathleen McGuire asked
Banaji ... 'Can a black defendant get a fair trial in New Hampshire
because of the largely white population we have?' . . . 'I want to say
yes,' Banaji said. 'But I know too much to say yes."' 130 She then
referred to the compelling results of the IAT and other implicit social
cognition research she had presented to the court on racial bias.1 31
Despite Banaji's testimony, Judge McGuire rejected the defense's
pre-trial motion and ruled that implicit bias in society did not prohibit
the particular defendant from getting a fair trial.1 32 Judge McGuire
wrote: "[T]hese studies concerning implicit racial bias do not establish
that any such bias will infect this case. Preliminarily, only one unpub-
lished dissertation has linked IAT scores with mock jurors' individual
decisions, and no studies have examined the IAT in jury deliberations
in real trials. ' 133 This rejection of the alleged connection between im-
plicit bias and a particular defendant's right to a fair trial highlights
the need for the development of new interdisciplinary theories that
apply social cognition specifically in the capital context.134 The next
Part proposes two areas where social cognition theory may help de-
velop a more focused understanding of implicit bias in the context of
capital punishment.
III. NEW HYPOTHESES: SOCIAL COGNITION AND THE
DEATH PENALTY
This Part introduces two hypotheses that apply social cognition the-
ories directly to the death penalty context. It first discusses Death
129. Melanie Asmar, Professor: Racism Will Mar Trial, CONCORD MONITOR, Apr. 15, 2008,
available at http://www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080415/FRONT
PAGE/804150335.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Special Report: Addison Capital Murder Trial Set to Begin, WMUR, Oct. 3, 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.wmur.com/addisontrial/17514509/detail.html#-.
133. Order (Defendant's Motion to Bar Death Penalty No. 25) at 18, New Hampshire v. Ad-
dison, No. 07-S-0254 (N.H. Super. Ct. June 5, 2008).
134. This statement is also true for non-capital cases. Implicit associations and stereotypes
must be investigated in contexts that will prove more relevant using standards of traditional legal
analysis. Striving for this type of relevancy, a few legal scholars used the approach of critiquing
very particular aspects of the law in light of psychological research. See generally Kang, supra
note 2 (focusing specifically on communications law); Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided:
How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49
How. L.J. 1 (2005) (focusing on criminal law's mens rea requirement); Justin D. Levinson &
Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort
Law's Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 195 (2004) (examin-
ing tort law in light of cultural psychological knowledge).
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Penalty Priming Hypothesis, and then explores Racial Bias Masking
Hypothesis. Before proceeding, it must be cautioned that these hy-
potheses are preliminary and have not yet been empirically examined.
Future research should pursue these hypotheses further.
A. Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis
Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis proposes that death qualifica-
tion, instead of providing a fair and meaningful system of empanelling
capital jurors, systematically elicits implicit racial bias in capital jurors.
As proposed, Death Penalty Priming works as follows: when jury ve-
nire members are "death qualified," the supposedly race-neutral line
of questioning acts as an indirect prime that triggers stereotypes of
African Americans, including criminality, dangerousness, and guilt.
These largely implicit stereotypes, which most Americans likely pos-
sess,135 become activated during the death qualification process, and
subsequently affect the way jurors process information, deliberate,
and render verdicts when African-American defendants are on trial.
To understand Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, one must con-
sider what happens in the minds of jurors during the death qualifica-
tion process. 136 One might assume that jurors grapple with their
feelings about life, death, and justice, and rely on their personal
morals, values, and perceptions of civic responsibility. 137 These intu-
135. Data on the IAT, for example, thus far indicates that most American participants who
have been tested display implicit racial stereotypes. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying
text.
136. See, e.g., Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the
Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984).
137. These intuitive assumptions also underlie scholarship and cases focusing on the ways in
which death qualified jurors differ from excludable jurors. Research has shown, for example,
that because of differing values, the death qualification process tends to create juries that are
more Caucasian, more male, and more likely to convict. See, e.g., Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46-48 (1984); see also Richard Salgado, Tribunals Organized to Convict:
Searching for a Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror Death-Qualification Process in United States v.
Green, 2005 BYU L. REV. 519, 530-31; William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and
Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 109
(1984); Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries' Bias and the Benefits of
True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ ST. L.J. 769, 784-85 (2006) ("The death qualification process today
still seats juries uncommonly willing to find guilt, and uncommonly willing to mete out death.
'Capital jurors hold disproportionately punitive orientations toward crime and criminal justice,
are more likely to be conviction-prone, are more likely to hold racial stereotypes, and are more
likely to be pro-prosecution."'); Salgado, supra note 137, at 520 (summarizing, "Thanks to death-
qualification, 'capital juries are more likely to be white, older, predominantly male, Protestant,
and less educated than other criminal juries, and than the society from which they were picked."'
(citing David Lindorff, Aiming for a Conviction, NATION, at http://www.thenation.com/doc.
mhtml?i=20020513&s=indorff20025O2 (May 2, 2002))).
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itions, however, rely only on inquiries into the juror's conscious cogni-
tive processes, and are therefore incomplete. A more complete
inquiry requires asking what happens in jurors' non-conscious minds
during death qualification. Instead of focusing only on explicit values
and beliefs, one must ask: What cognitive associations are being
formed automatically? What stereotypes are being indirectly trig-
gered? One possibility worth pursuing is the hypothesis that death
qualification activates predictable, meaningful, and racially biased im-
plicit cognitions in a majority of empanelled capital jurors.
This Section's preliminary exploration of Death Penalty Priming
Hypothesis pursues four related topics that help explain why the pro-
cess of death qualifying jurors might unintentionally trigger racial ste-
reotypes. This Section first briefly summarizes the death qualification
process. 138 It then explores how the death qualification process, com-
pared to voir dire alone, alters the way people think and make deci-
sions. 139 It then investigates how indirect primes, such as the
seemingly race-neutral death qualification process, can activate racial
stereotypes. 140 Next, it addresses the issue of why death qualification
primes race in particular. 141 Finally, it explores whether the death
penalty prime, once activated by death qualification, can affect the
way jurors process information and make decisions.142
1. Death Qualification: A Quick Summary
Death qualification is "the process by which prospective jurors are
questioned at voir dire regarding their attitudes toward the death pen-
alty.' 43 Prospective jurors may be excused for cause if they would
not convict a defendant who might receive the death penalty "regard-
less of the evidence,"' 44 or "would not consider death as a possible
138. See infra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 148-153 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 154-173 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 212-219 and accompanying text.
143. Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death Qualifica-
tion, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 677 (2002).
144. Id. As the Supreme Court has stated, "A 'death-qualified' jury is one from which pro-
spective jurors have been excluded for cause in light of their inability to set aside their views
about the death penalty that "would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their]
duties as [jurors] in accordance with [their] instructions and [their] oath."' Buchanan v.
Kenucky, 483 U.S. 402, 407-08 n.6 (1987) (alteration in original) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980))). The prosecutor may
remove such potential jurors according to the guidelines set out in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968), as refined by the decision in Wainright v. Witt. As Susan Rozelle explains:
Some people oppose the death penalty so fervently that they would go to almost any
length to avoid contributing to a death sentence. If their opposition is so strong that
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sentence regardless of the circumstances of the crime. ' 145 Although
empirical evidence has indicated that the death qualification process
results in juries that are more conviction prone, more likely to impose
the death penalty, and are less racially diverse, to date the Supreme
Court has rejected challenges to its use based on these empirical find-
ings.146 As Justice Rehnquist reasoned for the majority in Lockhart v.
McCree:
"Death Qualification," unlike the wholesale exclusion of blacks,
women, or Mexican-Americans from jury service, is carefully de-
signed to serve the State's concededly legitimate interest in ob-
taining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply the law
to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a
capital trial.147
Death qualification thus involves questioning jurors about their atti-
tudes related to the death penalty, their willingness to convict a defen-
dant who could potentially be executed, and their willingness to
consider sentencing the defendant to death. Although the Court has
assumed that asking jurors questions about the death penalty serves as
a legitimate way to determine jury excusals, it is possible that asking
jurors these seemingly race-neutral questions evokes a complex net-
work of related cognitive associations. The Subsections that follow
explore this possibility.
2. Death Qualification Changes the Way Jurors Think
It may not be intuitive that death qualification temporarily changes
the way jurors think and make decisions. Yet studies that specifically
focus on death qualification have already demonstrated that people
exposed to the death qualification process make different decisions as
they are unwilling to risk any possibility that someone may be sentenced to death, they
are what are known as 'nullifiers.' These are individuals who would refuse to convict of
a death-eligible crime despite evidence at trial convincing them beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt on that score.
Rozelle, supra 137, at 775-76; see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986). There are
additional, though less common circumstances, that would warrant the excusal of a juror for
cause. For example, the Supreme Court has held that jurors who would always vote to impose
the death penalty may be excused for cause. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992).
145. Rozelle, supra note 143, at 677.
146. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). It is worth noting that unlike challenges to
death qualification based on differences between the venire and the empanelled jury, Death
Penalty Priming Hypothesis posits that the final members of the empanelled jury (rather than
only the excluded venire members) have had racial bias triggered.
147. Id. at 175-76. Justice Rehnquist did not consider or address the possibility that the death
qualification process itself causes the juries to be unable to impartially apply the law to the facts
of the case.
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a result of it.148 In a 1984 study, Craig Haney examined the "process
effects" of death qualification and hypothesized that death qualifica-
tion "may predispose [jurors] to receive and interpret evidence in cer-
tain ways, and influence the verdict and sentencing decisions they may
be called upon to make. 1 49 In Haney's empirical study, participants
who were jury eligible citizens of California viewed videotapes of a
voir dire in a supposed murder trial. 150 Half of the study participants
watched a voir dire that included a thirty-minute segment of death
qualification, and the other half watched a voir dire that included no
death qualification. 15' After watching the videotapes, all participants
completed a questionnaire asking them about the trial.
Results of the study showed that participants who watched death
qualification answered questions differently than participants who
watched no death qualification. 152 More specifically, compared to
participants who only watched voir dire, participants who watched
death qualification were more likely to predict that the defendant
would be convicted of first-degree murder and receive the death pen-
alty, more likely to predict that the prosecutor, defense attorney, and
judge believed the defendant to be guilty, and more likely to predict
that the prosecutor and judge had personal attitudes that favored the
death penalty. 153 Overall, these results showed that viewing a death
qualification altered the way the participants thought about major ele-
ments of the trial. Although Haney's study relied on videotaped
death qualification, and thus did not death qualify the participants
themselves, the study is nonetheless compelling. It demonstrates that
death qualification generates clear process effects: it affected the way
participants thought about the case, the evidence, and the participants
in the legal process. Haney's study, however, did not examine race in
the context of death qualification. The next inquiry, then, should be
to ask whether death qualification, other than changing the way jurors
think generally, indirectly triggers jurors' racial attitudes and
stereotypes.
148. See Haney, supra note 136.
149. Id. at 122.
150. Id. at 124. The videotapes were reenactments conducted in a courtroom by experienced
attorneys who relied upon facts from an actual murder trial. Other attorneys then reviewed the
videotapes and confirmed their realistic nature. Id. The jurors in the trial consisted of both jury
eligible citizens and confederates of the researcher. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 126.
153. Id. at 126-27.
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3. Indirect Primes Can Activate Racial Stereotypes
Death qualification may activate jurors' implicit racial stereotypes
by indirectly priming racial constructs. 154 This Subsection will first
briefly recap how priming works and then explain how indirect primes
can activate racial stereotypes. "[P]riming refers to the process by
which recently activated information about a group (e.g., stereotypes)
is used in making subsequent judgments of group-related stimuli. This
information is part of an associative network of related schemas that
are linked in memory. ' 155 When meaningful stimuli are primed, sim-
ple exposure to them elicits a network of related associations, even
though the participant may be entirely unaware that there has been a
prime at all. Priming studies thus show that "[m]ere exposure to...
aspects of a group stereotype itself can be sufficient to activate stereo-
typic associations, often without attention or awareness."1 56
When examining the hypothesis that death qualification primes ra-
cial stereotypes, it is important to emphasize that stereotypes can be
indirectly primed. After all, death qualification requires that jurors
are asked not about race, but about their attitudes related to the death
penalty. Part II explained two studies that demonstrated how indirect
priming can activate related stereotypes. First, Steele and Aronson's
study showed that simply telling participants that a test was evaluative
of ability primed racial stereotypes of African Americans relating to
intelligence.1 57 Similarly, Bargh and his colleagues' study demon-
strated that simply having participants read elderly stereotype words
like "wise," "worried," and "bingo" activated the unrelated elderly
stereotype of slowness and even caused participants to behave accord-
ing to that stereotype.1 58 There are two more indirect prime examples
that support the claim that asking someone about the death penalty
generally can prime concepts that are associated with the death pen-
154. Recall that Part II introduced the concept of priming. See supra note 52 and accompany-
ing text.
155. Travis L. Dixon & Keith B. Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality Judg-
ments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and Dangerous Black Criminal, 35 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1555, 1556 (2005). For a discussion of stereotypes, memory, and racial bias in legal
decision making, see Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6.
156. James D. Johnson & Sophie Trawalter, Converging Interracial Consequences of Exposure
to Violent Rap Music on Stereotypical Attributions of Blacks, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 233, 233 (2000). Interestingly, these stereotypic associations can become activated
"regardless of [a person's] level of prejudice or personal endorsement of the stereotype." Id. at
236.
157. See Steele & Aronson, supra note 54, at 798.
158. See Bargh et al., supra note 52, at 237.
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alty. 159 The first of these examples follows up Steele and Aronson's
stereotype threat priming study by using entirely different indirect
primes, and the second investigates how priming indirect and non-ag-
gressive stereotypes of African Americans, like athleticism, will none-
theless prime stereotypes of African-American hostility.
Follow-up studies of stereotype threat have shown that it can be
elicited even by using more indirect (proxy) primes. Margaret Shih,
Todd Pittinsky, and Nalini Ambady used an indirect method of prim-
ing student-participants' ethnic identity, but found similarly powerful
results.160 In that study, the researchers asked Asian-American fe-
male participants to fill out questionnaires prior to taking a math
test.161 Some of these questionnaires asked the participants about
their roommate and dormitory living situations (this condition was de-
signed to prime gender identity), while others received questionnaires
asking them about their family, including asking what languages were
spoken at home, and how many generations of their family had lived
in the United States (this condition was designed to prime ethnic iden-
tity). 162 Results of the study showed that this method of indirect prim-
ing significantly affected the participants' test performance. 163
Participants who had their Asian identity primed performed best on
the test, while participants who had their female identity primed per-
formed worst on the test.' 64
A study by Patricia Devine found that subliminally priming some
racial stereotypes, such as lazy and athletic, activated other unrelated
racial stereotypes of African Americans, such as hostility. 165 Devine
used a visual priming task that required participants to identify the
location of quickly flashing projected words. The location of the
words was evident, but the words flashed so quickly and were masked
159. This Subsection only asserts that the death penalty can be an indirect prime for associ-
ated concepts. The next Subsection explains why the death penalty primes racial stereotypes.
See infra notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
160. Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative
Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. Sci. 80 (1999).
161. Id. at 81.
162. Id. A third group received questionnaires asking them about their telephone and cable
television service. This condition was designed not to prime ethnic or gender identity. Id.
163. Id. at 82. As in the other studies described, the participants were unaware that they had
been primed. Id. at 81.
164. Id. at 81. Participants who were not primed for ethnicity or gender performed second
best. Id.
165. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Compo-
nents, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 9 (1989) (citing J.C. Brigham, Ethnic Stereotypes,
76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 15 (1971)).
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such that participants only unconsciously recognized their content.166
The flashing words were coded so that, even without participants' con-
scious awareness, racial stereotypes were activated. 167 The flashing
words included category words that the experimenters associated with
African Americans, such as "Blacks" and "Negroes," and stereotype
words that the experimenters also associated with African Americans,
such as "poor" and "athletic. '168 After the priming was accomplished,
participants read a story about a person engaging in ambiguously hos-
tile behaviors-such as demanding money back from a store clerk-
and were asked to make judgments about the person engaging in
these behaviors. 169 The results of the study indicated that participants
who were primed with more stereotyped words judged the actor's am-
biguous behavior as more hostile than participants who were primed
with fewer stereotyped words. 170 As Devine summarized, "the auto-
matic activation of the racial stereotype affects the encoding and in-
terpretation of ambiguously hostile behaviors for both high- and low-
prejudice subjects. ' 171 Although traits such as "lazy" and "athletic"
are unrelated to the trait of "hostile," the stereotype congruity be-
tween the primed stereotypes and the trait of hostility made partici-
pants more likely to judge a behavior as hostile. 172
Applied to the death qualification context, these priming studies
show that in order to prime racial stereotypes in jurors, one need not
do so directly with those particular stereotypes. So long as the prime
is connected to the relevant stereotype through an associative network
of stereotypes, it can become activated.173 The next Subsection pur-
sues the question of why discussions of the death penalty during death
qualification trigger racial stereotypes.
166. Id. The researchers confirmed that participants did not immediately recognize the con-
tent of the words. Id.. The mask referred to was a series of jumbled letters that appeared imme-
diately after each stimuli word.
167. Id. Devine used the same priming procedure previously used by Bargh and Pie-
tromonoco. See John A. Bargh & Paula Pietromonaco, Automatic Information Processing and
Social Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented Outside of Conscious Awareness
on Impression Formation, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 437, 441 (1982).
168. See Devine, supra note 165, at 9-10.
169. Id. at 10.
170. Id. at 11-12.
171. Id. at 11.
172. Id. at 12. These associations appeared to operate entirely implicitly, as results of the
study were not related to participants' explicit racial prejudices.
173. It is also important to note that in Devine's study, as in the other studies previously
described, the prime was activated prior to the presentation and encoding of social information,
and yet still affected judgments of that social information. This initial priming, followed by pres-
entation of information requiring judgment, mirrors the process of death qualification and the
subsequent trial.
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4. Why Death Qualification Primes Race
Now that it is established that indirect primes can trigger racial ste-
reotypes of aggression and hostility, it must be inquired specifically
whether the death qualification process primes similar racial stereo-
types. If people do not automatically associate the death penalty and
race, the Death Penalty Prime will not harm any particular group.
The inquiry into whether people automatically associate the death
penalty and race requires examining the history of racial disparities in
the death penalty, as well as studies that demonstrate the racialized
portrayal of crime and the death penalty in the media.
a. Historical Relationship between Race and the Death Penalty
History demonstrates that if there is one salient theme related to
the death penalty-other than death itself-that theme is race.174 Ac-
cording to Charles Ogletree, Jr. and Austin Sarat, the death penalty
has been "a tool that has been used, throughout history, to oppress
racial minorities, and specifically, African-Americans. '' 175 Stuart Ban-
ner described two ways in which the death penalty has been used
throughout American history as a tool of oppression: by defining cap-
ital crimes unequally based on race and reinforcing the racial hierar-
chy through the manner of executions.176 The first tool of oppression,
defining crimes unequally based on race, refers to colonial and early
state penal codes that listed specific capital crimes for African-Ameri-
can defendants. There are numerous examples. In New York, a slave
convicted of attempted murder or attempted rape was specifically eli-
gible for the death penalty. 177 South Carolina targeted slaves and
"free Blacks" in a law that provided death as the sentence for burning
or destroying grain or commodities.178 Georgia made it a capital of-
fence for slaves or free Blacks to strike Whites twice, or once if it
caused a bruise. 179
The second tool of oppression Banner described, reinforcing racial
hierarchy through the manner of executions, refers both to the way
174. See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS, supra note 1; BANNER, supra note 1; KENNEDY, supra
note 1.
175. FROM LYNCH MoBs, supra note 1, at 3.
176. Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical Perspective, in
FROM LYNCH MOBS, supra note 1, at 96, 97.
177. Id. at 98. Banner described several statutory schemes specifically identifying slaves as
eligible for the death penalty. He also noted that preambles to statutes contained legislators'
beliefs that "noncapital penalties were not stiff enough to deter slaves from committing crimes."
Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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African-American defendants were put through painful and degrading
methods of execution, and to the way executions often included spe-
cific racial messages of racial subservience. 1 0 Common methods of
execution for convicted slaves and free Blacks included burning them
alive, and subsequently displaying the corpses in public places. Dis-
playing of the corpse in a metal cage designed for viewing carried the
purpose "an extra dose of terror" directed at "other slaves in commu-
nities where crime had occurred." 181 In addition to the execution
methods themselves, the ceremonies surrounding the executions fre-
quently incorporated messages of subservience. According to one
story retold by Banner:
[Alt the 1819 hanging of Rose Butler, a New York City slave con-
victed of setting fire to her owner's house, the Baptist minister John
Sandford directed his remarks to the black spectators .... In this
inestimable privilege, our fellow citizens of color enjoy a mutual
share with us; and this unquestionably should dictate to them a cor-
respondent spirit of gratitude and the practice of every social virtue.
It is therefore deeply to be regretted that persons of color should
either envy or attempt to destroy the safety and comfort to which
we are justly entitled.182
Banner argued that the history of the death penalty, which for centu-
ries was used as "a means of racial control," continues to influence the
way people think about the death penalty. 183 He summarized, "When
we think about the death penalty, we think, in part, in race-tinged
pictures-of black victims lynched by white mobs, of black defendants
condemned by white juries, of slave codes and public hangings. ''184
This notion specifically supports an underlying claim of Death Penalty
Priming Hypothesis: asking prospective jurors to consider and discuss
the death penalty automatically triggers racial associations.
b. Death, African-American Stereotypes, and the Media
No empirical studies have examined directly whether supposedly
race-neutral discussions of the death penalty activate racial stereo-
types. However, research on the continuing media portrayal of Afri-
can Americans as aggressive criminals, sometimes examined
particularly in coverage of death penalty cases, supports the argument
that when people think about the death penalty, they think about Af-
rican Americans. As empirical evidence will demonstrate: (1) the
180. Id. at 101-07.
181. Id. at 104.
182. Banner, supra note 176, at 101-02 (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. at 107-08.
184. Id. at 97.
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media relies on African-American stereotypes when discussing death
penalty cases, (2) the stereotypicality of African-American defendants
is related to death penalty conviction rates; and (3) race-specific and
non-race-specific crime portrayals activate stereotypes of the aggres-
sive African American, which in turn affect emotional reactions, pol-
icy judgments, and decision making.
In a compelling study, Phillip Goff and his colleagues showed that
newspaper coverage of death penalty trials included racial stereotypes
of African Americans. 185 The researchers reviewed newspaper cover-
age of murder cases in the Philadelphia area from 1979 to 1999.186
Employing a coding methodology, researchers compared the number
of times "bestial or sub-human" references were made in Philadelphia
Inquirer articles related to death penalty cases, and compared refer-
ences for Black defendants versus White defendants. 18 7 As they hy-
pothesized, the number of "ape-like" words used in cases with Black
defendants (approximately 8.5 mentions per article) was significantly
higher than in cases with White defendants (approximately 2.2 men-
tions per article). 188 Interestingly, the researchers also found a direct
relationship between the articles' "bestial or subhuman" content and
the trial outcome: Black defendants who were put to death were por-
trayed with a greater number of ape-like representations in articles
than Black defendants who were not put to death. 18 9 This study
powerfully demonstrates that even supposedly race-neutral portrayals
of death penalty crimes incorporate harmful racial stereotypes of Afri-
can Americans.
Jennifer Eberhardt and her colleagues have also demonstrated the
strong association between racial stereotypes of African Americans
and the death penalty. 190 Using data from Baldus and his colleagues'
database of Philadelphia death penalty cases, the researchers ex-
amined the relationship between the stereotypicality of Black defend-
ants' facial features and the trial outcome.' 9' Supporting the
contention that there is an inextricable link between stereotypes of
185. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumaniza-
tion, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 303 (2008).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 304.
189. Id.; see also Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality
of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 383, 384 (2006)
(finding that in capital cases with White victims in Philadelphia, Black defendants who looked
stereotypically Black were more likely to receive the death penalty than Black defendants who
looked less stereotypically Black).
190. Eberhardt et al., supra note 189, at 384.
191. Id. at 383-84.
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African Americans and the death penalty, the researchers found that
Black defendants whose faces exhibited more stereotypically Black fa-
cial features received the death penalty significantly more than Black
defendants with less stereotypic features.' 92
Empirical studies have shown that when people have race-salient
associations between concepts, such as African Americans and crimes
of aggression, discussing one of these concepts in race-neutral terms
will nonetheless prime racial stereotypes. Travis Dixon and Christina
Azocar, for example, found that local news contributed to a "chroni-
cally accessible" stereotype of Blacks as criminals. 193 In two studies,
Dixon and Azocar examined the "chronic accessibility" hypothesis. 194
In both studies, participants watched a video that contained local news
stories of several murders. 195 Some participants watched videos that
portrayed White suspects, some watched videos that portrayed Black
suspects, and others watched videos that portrayed race-unidentified
suspects. 196 In the first study, the researchers found that heavy televi-
sion news-watching participants who saw videos with race-unidenti-
fied suspects were more likely to support the death penalty.' 97
According to Dixon and Azocar, "Apparently, when exposed to a
number of unidentified suspects, heavy news-viewing participants
were more likely to apply a schematic representation of Blacks. This
schema increased support for the death penalty .. ."198
In the second study, the researchers found that participants who
viewed news stories featuring mostly Black suspects were more likely
to make later harsh culpability judgments of a race-unidentified crimi-
nal.' 99 The researchers interpreted these results to support their hy-
pothesis of the chronic activation of stereotypes.200 According to
Dixon and Azocar, in violent crime scenarios, race need not be specif-
ically mentioned in order to activate racial stereotypes: "[A]fter expo-
sure to a majority of Black criminals in the news, the Black criminal
192. Id. at 385. This finding was strongest when examining cases where victims were White.
Id.
193. Travis L. Dixon & Christina L. Azocar, Priming Crime and Activating Blackness: Under-
standing the Psychological Impact of the Overrepresentation of Blacks as Lawbreakers on Televi-
sion News, 57 J. COMM. 229, 233 (2007).
194. Id. at 230.
195. Id. at 235-36. The videos were edited so that they contained seven murder stories and
eight human interest stories. Id. at 235.
196. Id. at 236.
197. Id. at 240.
198. Id. at 241 (internal citations omitted). The researchers also found that stereotypes of
Black laziness were activated. Id.
199. Dixon & Azocar, supra note 193, at 244.
200. Id. at 246.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
stereotype may become automatically activated and subsequently
used to make relevant judgments regarding both race and crime. '20 1
This conclusion supports the hypothesis of Death Penalty Priming:
simply asking jurors about their views of the death penalty can prime
racial biases against African Americans. 202
A study conducted by Frank Gilliam and Shanto Iyengar provides
more evidence demonstrating the inseparability of race and mur-
der.20 3 The researchers tested how participants remembered a local
news story they saw depicting a murder.20 4 All participants saw the
same local news portrayal of a murder except for one element:
whether or not they saw a photo of the suspect. 20 5 The researchers
found that sixty percent of the participants who saw no suspect falsely
recalled having seen a photo of a suspect, and of those participants,
seventy percent falsely remembered seeing a Black suspect.20 6 This
false memory effect can. be best explained by reference to what the
researchers call "scripts," story-based expectations relating to murder-
ers.20 7 This finding demonstrates that simply thinking about a murder
can trigger racially relevant constructs based upon stereotypes of Afri-
can Americans.
The link between race and murder can even trigger heightened
emotional reactions in people learning about the murders. Travis
Dixon and Keith Maddox showed participants a fifteen-minute video
of local news, the relevant part of which was a twenty-two second
201. Id. at 232.
202. As I explain in note 207, this study could indicate that racial stereotype priming could
occur in non-capital cases.
203. Frank D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Televi-
sion News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 560, 561 (2000). The results I discuss here
were part of a pre-test for a larger study.
204. Id. at 564.
205. One-third of the participants saw a photo of a White male, one-third of the participants
saw a photo of a Black male, and one-third of the participants saw no picture of a suspect at all.
Id. at 563.
206. Id. at 564.
207. Id. at 561. Interestingly, these story-based "scripts" are reminiscent of the way jurors
have been shown to think about cases. See Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment
Stories: Testing a Story-Mediated Model of Juror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 27 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 29 (2003); Reid Hastie, The Role of "Stories" in Civil Jury Judgments, 32 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 227 (1999); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychologi-
cal Research on Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 90,
95 (1990); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of
Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COG-
NITION 521 (1988).
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story about the murder of a police officer.20 8 In the video, the re-
searchers varied the race and skin tone of the perpetrator's photo,
which was shown for three seconds, and separately asked the partici-
pants to report on their television news watching habits. 20 9 The re-
sults indicated that participants expressed more emotional concern
about the murder when the suspect was portrayed as a dark-skinned
black man compared to a white man.210
Taken together, these studies show that, among other things: (1)
the media incorporates African-American stereotypes when discuss-
ing death penalty cases; (2) the stereotypicality of African-American
defendants is related to death penalty conviction rates; and (3) both
race-specific and race-neutral crime portrayals activate stereotypes of
the aggressive African American, which in turn affect emotional reac-
tions, policy judgments, and decision making. As a result, one might
predict that there is an implicit association between the death penalty
and race that becomes activated during the supposedly race-neutral
death qualification process.211
5. Death Penalty Priming and Jury Decision Making
Once a prime has been activated, it can affect decision making and
behavior. In the context of the death penalty, priming racial stereo-
types during death qualification can affect subsequent jury decision
making. This Article has discussed studies that have shown how prim-
ing can affect decision making and behavior. For example, Steele and
Aronson found that priming race in African-American students af-
fected subsequent test performance. 212 Shih, Petinsky, and Ambady
found that indirectly priming ethnicity and gender in Asian-American
women similarly affected test performance.213 Bargh found that prim-
ing elderly stereotypes affected the speed at which participants
208. Dixon & Maddox, supra note 155, at 1561. In many jurisdictions, murdering a police
officer serves as an aggravating factor that can make a defendant death eligible. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(5) (1975); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(6) (2008).
209. Dixon & Maddox, supra note 155, at 1560-61.
210. Id. at 1562. Interestingly, this effect was related to the participants' television news view-
ing habits. Participants who frequently watched television news were more concerned about the
murder when they saw a dark-skinned black suspect than a white suspect. However, participants
who watched only a little television news did not display this bias. Heavy news viewers also
rated the victims of Black perpetrators more positively than victims of White perpetrators. Id. at
1563.
211. Although it is most likely that death qualification activates the Death Penalty Prime, it is
also possible that other parts of a capital trial (including eyewitness testimony, voir dire, and
more) might trigger implicit racial biases. As with Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, these
possibilities should be examined empirically.
212. Steele & Aronson, supra note 54, at 808..
213. Shih et al., supra note 160, at 82.
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walked.214 Finally, Devine found that priming unrelated racial stereo-
types, such as lazy and athletic, affected the way people interpreted
ambiguously hostile behaviors.21 5 An additional example of priming's
effects on decision making helps support the hypothesis that activating
racial stereotypes at trial will likely affect juror decision making. This
research has demonstrated that the stereotype of the aggressive and
violent African American can affect judgments of job qualifications,
disposition, and more.
James Johnson and his colleagues primed participants by playing
segments of either a violent or non-violent rap song.2 16 Participants
later read supposedly unrelated stories of ambiguous behavior and
were asked to make judgments about people in the stories.21 7 Results
showed that participants who listened to the violent rap music, com-
pared to other participants, judged a Black male's aggressive behavior
as caused by dispositional factors (for example, a violent personality)
rather than situational factors (for example, stress related to a rela-
tionship break-up). 218 Further, results showed that participants who
listened to the violent rap music were more likely than the other par-
ticipants to judge a Black job applicant as less qualified for a job
requiring intelligence. 219 This study shows dramatically that racial
stereotype primes (here, rap music) can influence seemingly unrelated
judgments (here, job qualification) so long as they are broadly related
(both are stereotypes of African Americans). Taken in the context of
capital cases, if death qualification primes racial stereotypes, those ste-
reotypes could affect juror decision making.
In sum, research on race, priming, and decision making supports the
hypothesis that the supposedly race-neutral process of death qualifica-
tion primes racial stereotypes of African Americans. Further research
should continue to evaluate this hypothesis.
B. Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis
Implicit racial bias may even affect the accuracy of the most rigor-
ous studies of race and capital punishment. These studies use sophisti-
cated statistical methods to evaluate the role of race in capital
214. Bargh et al., supra note 52, at 237.
215. Devine, supra note 165, at 9.
216. Participants in the control condition did not listen to music. Johnson & Trawalter, supra
note 156, at 239; see also Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Conse-
quences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTER-
GROUP REL. 133, 138-39 (2002).
217. Johnson & Trawalter, supra note 156, at 240-41.
218. Id. at 242-43.
219. Id. at 244.
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punishment, but typically make important statistical adjustments
based on information that may already have been tainted by racial
stereotypes. One basic finding of social cognition research is that the
human mind can unintentionally incorporate stereotypes into the way
people remember situations and tell stories.220 If the case facts and
summaries relied upon in empirical studies of the death penalty al-
ready contain racial biases before statistical analysis begins, then the
statistical analysis relying on these facts can unintentionally mask ra-
cial bias. As a result, studies that find little or no effects of capital
defendants' race on trial outcome may unintentionally mask dispro-
portionate treatment based on defendants' race.221
1. Statistical Adjustments: Attempting to Equalize Culpability
Since the 1970s, David Baldus, George Woodworth, and other
scholars have conducted rigorous examinations of death penalty pros-
ecutions and convictions in a variety of jurisdictions.222 As their now
famous results consistently display, "[t]he race of the victim has a con-
sistent and robust influence on capital punishment,"223 but "race-of-
defendant discrimination is not an inevitable feature of all post-
Furman death sentencing systems. ' 22 4 In the context of capital cases,
researchers have used a range of statistical methodologies and varying
220. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 381 (citing ALLPORT & POST-
MAN, supra note 20, at 65-68); Richard L. Marsh et al., Gender and Orientation Stereotypes Bias
Source-Monitoring Attributions, 14 MEMORY 148, 157-58 (2006); Yoshihisa Kashima, Maintain-
ing Cultural Stereotypes in the Serial Reproduction of Narratives, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 594, 594 (2000).
221. Similarly, even studies that find such disparities based on a defendant's race may be
diminishing the actual severity of these disparities.
222. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 3; Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Admin-
istration of the Death Penalty, supra note 3; David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimina-
tion in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska
Experience (1971-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and
Discrimination]; David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998) [hereinafter Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death
Penalty]; BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3; GRoss & MAURO, supra note 3; Samuel
R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sen-
tencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984). See generally Lee, supra note
10 (analyzing several of these studies and discussing future research directions).
223. Phillips, supra note 3, at 814 (describing systematic studies conducted by Baldus and
Woodworth, as well as by the United States General Accounting Office); see generally Baldus &
Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty, supra note 3; U.S.
GENERAL AccoUrrING OFFICE, supra note 3.
224. Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment,
supra note 3, at 1412-13.
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levels of statistical sophistication. 225 The least statistically sophisti-
cated studies have used what Baldus and others called "unadjusted"
data. These studies have compared conviction rates based on the de-
fendant's race without making systematic attempts to control for cul-
pability, the victim's race, and aggravating and mitigating factors.226
Because relying on unadjusted data assumes that potentially con-
founding variables-everything other than the measured variables-
are equal, the most statistically sophisticated studies have employed
adjustment methodologies, designed to make better comparisons be-
tween groups. 227 For example, Baldus and colleagues' studies of
Georgia, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and more, attempted to statistically
control for factors such as defendant culpability, as well as aggravating
and mitigating factors.228 According to Baldus and Woodworth, the
purpose of adjusting data is to "minimize the risk that the influence of
race and defendant culpability will be confounded and lead to faulty
225. See Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Pen-
alty, supra note 3; Phillips, supra note 3, at 819-20.
226. In experimental studies, researchers can create functional equivalence between two
groups by randomly assigning study participants to two groups. See J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (2005). However, in non-random situations, such as when comparing
capital defendants, an assumption of equivalence cannot be made. Baldus and Woodworth give
the following examples of "unadjusted" studies, supra note 3, at 215-25: State v. Cobb, 663 A.2d
948 (Conn. 1995); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in
Illinois, 1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39 (2002); Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of
Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32 JURIMETRICS 33 (1991);
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death
Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1991); PEG BORTNER & ANDY HALL, ARIZONA CAPITAL
CASE COMMISSION, ARIZONA FIRST-DEGREE MURDER CASES SUMMARY OF 1995-1999 INDICr-
MENTS: DATA SET II RESEARCH REPORT TO ARIZONA CAPITAL CASE COMMISSION (2002);
MARY ZIEMBA-DAVIS & BRENT L. MYERS, INDIANA CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE APPLI-
CATION OF INDIANA'S CAPITAL SENTENCING LAW: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR FRANK O'BANNON
AND THE INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Jan. 10, 2002) (on file with the Indiana Criminal Justice
Institute, Indianapolis, Indiana).
227. Phillips lists the following jurisdictions as those where "reasonably well-controlled" stud-
ies have been conducted: California, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Philadelphia, and South Carolina. Phillips, supra note 3, at
808 (citing David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty:
An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 501,
517-19 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003)). Reasonably well-controlled studies are those
"including statistical controls for 10 or more legitimate non-racial case characteristics." Id. Ac-
cording to Baldus & Woodworth, a significant amount of research "is not well controlled, and
the results appear to be very dependent on local politics, crime rates, public opinion about crime
and punishment, jury selection procedures, capital charging and sentencing processes, and the
presence or absence of measures developed to limit the risk of racial discrimination." Baldus &
Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, supra note 3, at
1419.
228. See generally BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3; Baldus et al., Arbitrariness
and Discrimination, supra note 222; Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty,
supra note 222.
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inferences about the impact of race on decision-making. ' 22 9 Thus, the
goal of making adjustments is to eliminate confounds by controlling
"for legitimate case characteristics. '230
Empirical researchers who employ sophisticated adjustment meth-
odologies must bear a heavy fact-finding burden, as case facts are cru-
cial in statistically determining how one can compare theoretically
alike groups of cases. These researchers have relied on a variety of
fact sources, including media reports, pre-sentencing reports, supple-
mental homicide reports, trial records, judicial opinions, and more. A
2008 study of death penalty cases in Houston, Texas, by Scott Phillips
relied solely on Houston Chronicle newspaper accounts of murders to
determine the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the
murders examined.231 Relying on Baldus and Woodworth's complex
framework for coding and adjusting statistics, Phillips systematically
coded the Houston Chronicle stories into facts that described the na-
ture of the killings.232 For example, Phillips classified whether the sto-
ries described the defendant using physical or mental torture (an
aggravating factor under Baldus and his colleagues' framework) or
whether they described provocation of the defendant (a mitigating
factor)..233 Baldus and colleagues have used a variety of fact-gathering
techniques, but have also sometimes relied upon media sources in de-
ciding how to weigh aggravating versus mitigating factors. In their
study of Pennsylvania, for example, in addition to using various other
sources, Baldus and colleagues relied upon newspaper accounts to
supplement other factual sources.234
229. Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty,
supra note 3, at 196. Because the researchers seek to test like cases against one another and then
measure for race effects, the purpose of the statistical adjustments are to equalize non-equal
facts. If White Defendant A has three aggravating factors and one mitigating factor, and Black
Defendant A has five aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, statistics can provide for a
hypothetical equalization of the White defendant case with Black defendant case, even if the
aggravating and mitigating factors are different. The problem, however, is that due to implicit
racial bias in the case facts, Black defendant cases may now contain erroneously high measures
of aggravating facts and erroneously low measures of mitigating facts relative to White defen-
dant cases.
230. Id. at 197.
231. Phillips, supra note 3, at 825. Phillips described his methodology:
[N]ewspaper articles about each case were collected from The Houston Chronicle on-
line archive (an average of 6.75 articles per case, for a total of more than 3,400 articles).
The aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each case were coded based on a list
drawn from Baldus and colleagues' research on race and capital punishment.
Id. (citing BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 526-35).
232. Id. (citing BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 526-35).
233. Id.
234. According to the authors, "newspaper accounts, obtained on-line, were often helpful."
Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty, supra note 222, at 1671.
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Not all of the studies that have employed adjustment methodologies
rely on media sources for case facts. Baldus and colleagues' study of
Nebraska, for example, did not rely on the news media for fact gather-
ing. Instead, the researchers relied largely upon "pre-sentence investi-
gation reports," which, according to the researchers, "include[] a
detailed description of the defendant that is generated by a probation
officer following a criminal conviction" and contain "a description of
the crime that is generated from the trial record, police reports, and
interviews with the defendant. ' 235 Michael Songer and Isaac Unah
used supplemental homicide reports236 and court case reports to de-
termine case facts.2 37 Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro relied almost
exclusively on supplemental homicide reports. 238 Regardless of which
particular sources of facts the researchers select, scholars recognize
that fact gathering is one of the most important stages of empirical
research. As Baldus and colleagues cautioned separately in several
articles, "a major challenge in this type of research is obtaining relia-
ble data on the cases. '239
Empirical researchers, and most prominently Baldus and his col-
leagues, have explicitly recognized that even the most sophisticated
statistical analyses make assumptions that can later be challenged.
One goal in devising a study that measures anything complex, and cer-
tainly in designing a study that measures racial disparities in capital
cases, is to avoid ignoring data or variables that might change the re-
sults in a meaningful way. As Baldus and his colleagues explained,
one danger of overlooking relevant variables would be a distortion
of our comparative-excessiveness analysis because we incorrectly
estimated the relative culpability of the cases....
An omitted variable could also bias the results of our race-of-
victim and race-of-defendant analyses in both [studies] if the varia-
ble omitted from the analysis influenced the decisions of prosecu-
tors and juries and if certain values of that variable occurred more
frequently in one racial subgroup than in the other.240
235. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination, supra note 222, at 689.
236. Supplemental homicide reports are "local police agencies file with the Uniform Crime
Reporting section of the FBI." Gross & Mauro, supra note 222, at 49.
237. Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on
Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161, 184-86
(2006).
238. Gross & Mauro, supra note 222, at 49.
239. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination, supra note 222, at 689. It is worth noting
that other than the potential influence of implicit racial bias in the case facts, the methodology
employed by Baldus and his colleagues is impressive, sound, and convincing. Every reasonable
step was taken to avoid human error.
240. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 430.
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Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis proposes that implicit racial bias in
case facts may be such an omitted variable..
Baldus and colleagues also specifically noted the possibility of a "re-
porting bias." One reporting bias
might be a tendency by those who provided information to parole
board investigators to describe the circumstances of the white-vic-
tim and black-defendant cases in an aggravated direction. This bias
would cause such cases in our study to appear to be more aggra-
vated than they actually were, thus reducing the observed race-of-
victim and race-of-defendant effects.241
Although Baldus and colleagues were likely referring to intentional
skewing of facts by prosecutors and law enforcement officers, this "re-
porting bias" could also describe an implicit bias that disproportion-
ately includes stereotypes in the underlying case facts. More
specifically, if implicit racial bias affects the way case facts are per-
ceived, remembered, told, retold, and recorded, these case facts may
systematically cause crimes involving African-American defendants to
appear more aggravated than they actually were. Such an uninten-
tional "implicit aggravation effect" would cause later statistical analy-
sis to mask or reduce racial disparities in case outcomes, because it
would falsely assume that African-American defendants committed
more aggravated crimes than they actually did.
2. Stereotypes Bias Case Facts
There are two primary reasons why the underlying case facts relied
upon by researchers might be biased: first, facts are selectively en-
hanced by law enforcement officers and prosecutors to make
prosecutorial decisions seem reasonable in retrospect; and second,
these facts become skewed unintentionally due to.implicit biases in
the way witnesses, law enforcement officers, attorneys, judges, and
news reporters perceive, encode, store, retrieve, and transmit informa-
tion. This Subsection briefly addresses the first possibility, and then
shifts to the second, social-cognition-based explanation.
a. Intentionally Biased Facts
Micheal Radelet and Glenn Pierce have provided one explanation
that would account for racial bias in the underlying case facts. 242 They
claim that prosecutors may initially select certain cases they wish to
pursue for the death penalty, and then selectively enhance the way
241. Id. at 444-45.
242. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide
Cases, 19 LAw & Soc'y REv. 587, 593 (1985).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
they discuss these cases, such that a later analysis would make the
decision seem justifiable.243 Radelet and Pierce summarize the
hypothesis:
[S]ome cases, which initially do not appear to be among the most
serious, are first selected for harsh treatment and then characterized
so as to appear similar to cases that were classified as most serious
from the time they entered the criminal justice process. The ability
of prosecutors or other criminal justice decision makers to develop
or minimize evidence in order to justify the results desired in partic-
ular cases may create an appearance of similarity among initially
dissimilar cases that reach the later stages of the criminal justice
system.
24 4
Summarizing the importance of this hypothesis, Radelet and Pierce
state, "if the process of selectively developing or ignoring evidence in
cases is related to extra-legal factors, such as race, then this process
will help create the illusion of even-handed justice at later stages in
the criminal justice system. ' '2 45
Radelet and Pierce pursued their hypothesis empirically by compar-
ing facts presented in police reports to facts later discussed by
prosecutors:
If a comparison of the police description of a homicide with the
subsequent description of the same homicide in the court records
reveals differences that parallel differences in the racial characteris-
tics of defendants and victims, then evidence suggesting selective
manipulation or amassing of evidence and racial bias would be
found. 246
Thus, Radelet and Pierce compared how prosecutors presented cases
in ways that were more or less serious than police had originally docu-
mented, and then tested whether these differences were related to the
race of the defendant or victim. Specifically, they focused on whether
or not police and prosecutors classified a defendant's actions in a mur-
der case as being in the process of committing another felony. This
factor serves as an aggravating factor in most capital jurisdictions, and
can therefore lead to the death penalty. Results of their study demon-
strated that prosecutors were more likely to "upgrade"-and less
likely to "downgrade"-the seriousness of the crime, relative to police
reports, in situations when Black defendants killed White victims. 247
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 594.
247. Id. at 606.
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It further showed that such "upgrading" increased the probability of a
death sentence by twenty-two percent. 248
Radelet and Pierce's study supports the contention that the facts
underlying various studies of the death penalty may be biased. Many
of the facts relied upon by researchers, such as jury determinations,
court transcripts, judicial opinions, and pre-sentencing reports are
generated after the prosecutor has become involved in the case. 249
b. Automatic and Unintentionally Biased Facts
Crucial case facts, such as descriptions of aggravating factors, may
also be racially biased, because automatic cognitive processes fre-
quently work to incorporate racial stereotypes in the perception, en-
coding, storage, and transmission of factual information. This
unintentional transmission of stereotypes can take place easily, and
can affect everything from simple storytelling to media accounts of
murders. Taken together, social cognition studies indicate that the
factual sources underlying empirical studies of the death penalty may
contain already racially biased information.
i. Propagation of bias in storytelling
A famous social psychological study on racial bias in storytelling
was conducted by Allport and Postman.250 Their study elegantly dem-
onstrates that people's minds can work automatically and in subtle
ways to incorporate incorrectly stereotypes of African Americans into
stories. In Allport and Postman's study,
participants viewed a picture of passengers on a streetcar (one of
whom was Black). In the picture, one White passenger holds a ra-
zor blade and the Black passenger is empty-handed. After viewing
the picture, participants were then asked to describe the picture to
other participants who had not seen the picture. As participants
told and retold the story to others, the story changed. After the
story had been retold several times, some participants reported that
the Black passenger-not the White passenger-held a razor
blade.251
More recent studies have followed up Allport and Postman's ground-
breaking work, and have confirmed that stereotypes tend to be trans-
248. Radelet & Pierce, supra note 242, at 614.
249. Studies that rely primarily on reports of law enforcement officers, generated prior to
prosecutor involvement, would presumably avoid the problems that Radelet and Pierce discuss.
See, e.g., GRoss & MAURO, supra note 3, at 35 (relying on supplemental homicide reports pro-
vided by local law enforcement agencies to the FBI).
250. ALLPORT & POSTMAN, supra note 20.
251. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 831.
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mitted as stories are retold multiple times. Yoshihisa Kashima, for
example, found that when stories are retold by multiple individuals,
stereotype-consistent information tended to remain in the stories but
stereotype-inconsistent information tended to drop out. 252 Applied to
the context of capital cases, this phenomenon would tend to indicate
that the earlier stage in which the information is gathered, the fewer
stereotype-consistent errors it is likely to have. Practically speaking,
such a conclusion would mean that police reports and eyewitness ac-
counts are less likely than court transcripts or pre-sentencing reports
to include racial stereotypes that are propagated through storytelling
transmission biases.2 53 It is worth noting, however, that by the time
factual sources such as court opinions and pre-sentencing reports are
generated, many of the underlying facts have been told and retold nu-
merous times.
ii. Encoding, storing, and retrieving stereotypes
In addition to biases caused by errors in storytelling, case facts may
be unintentionally biased due to memory errors. Social cognition re-
search demonstrates that the human mind can automatically mis-
remember facts in racially biased ways. These memory errors could
easily become incorporated into various descriptions of case facts that
researchers rely upon to make statistical comparisons. A study by
Alison Lenton and her colleagues found that stereotypes influenced
false memories.254 That is, when stereotypes were present, people
could actually believe that they remembered something that never
happened. In their empirical study, the researchers presented partici-
pants with word lists that included female stereotypes, such as secre-
tary and nurse, and male stereotypes, such as lawyer and soldier.255
After giving participants a brief distraction task, Lenton and her col-
leagues administered a recognition test. Results of this recognition
task indicated that participants often had false memories of having
seen gender-stereotyped words they had not seen, and "that these
false memories were elicited implicitly. '2 56 In fact, most participants
252. Kashima, supra note 220 at 601.
253. Other research, however, has demonstrated that eyewitness accounts, for example, are
themselves suspect, particularly when the eyewitness sees a perpetrator from another race. For a
discussion of "own-race bias," see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in
Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984). See also Christian A. Meissner & John C.
Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic
Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3 (2001).
254. See Lenton et al., supra note 6, at 5.
255. Id.
256. Much of the language of this paragraph, including citations, is taken more or less verba-
tim from an earlier work. See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6, at 379.
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were completely unaware of the word lists' gender stereotype theme.
The researchers expressed concern that the implicit creation of stereo-
type-consistent false memories may help to explain the "self-perpetu-
ating nature of stereotypes and their resistance to change. '257
Applied to the capital context, Lenton and her colleagues' study dem-
onstrates that people can unwittingly and inaccurately recast situa-
tions to conform with stereotypes. In the capital context, it might be
possible that people responsible for transmitting case facts-such as
witnesses, law enforcement officers, and attorneys-could fail to accu-
rately recall case information and unintentionally incorporate racial
biases into their recollections.
Part II described a project in which I argued that judges and juries
unintentionally misremember facts in racially biased ways.258 Recall
that in that study, participants read short stories of facts relating to a
fight between men after a bar altercation. Results of the study
showed that participants who read about an African-American actor
were more likely to remember aggressive actions taken by the ac-
tor.259 Building on Lenton's study of false memories, this study dem-
onstrates that the human mind can be quickly and automatically
influenced by stereotypes in subtle yet racially biased ways. If similar
biases influence the way facts are recorded and summarized prior to
their incorporation in empirical studies of the death penalty, then rely-
ing on those facts as accurate can lead to disproportionately biased
results.
These studies explain how errors in case facts may be generated
both from individuals misremembering stereotype-relevant informa-
tion, and through the unintentional propagation of misinformation
through storytelling. These fact-based errors could affect the factual
sources underlying empirical studies of the death penalty.
iii. Biased media reports
Because some empirical studies of the death penalty rely specifi-
cally on media sources, this Subsection focuses specifically on the me-
dia's role in mischaracterizing facts in racially biased ways. Empirical
studies have shown generally that the media systematically over-
represents African-American crimes, and specifically that the media
includes racial stereotypes in accounts of capital cases. Recall from
Part III.A that a study by Goff and his colleagues demonstrated that
257. Id. (quoting Lenton et al., supra note 6, at 12).
258. See generally Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6.
259. Id. at 350.
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media accounts of murders can be tainted by racial bias. 260 That study
found that Philadelphia Inquirer stories contained a disproportionate
amount of "ape-like" and "bestial" references when describing death
penalty cases of African-American defendants, compared to stories
describing death penalty cases of White defendants.261 In addition to
these findings of media bias in the factual and descriptive reporting of
death penalty cases, the study found a direct connection between the
news article bias (the ape-like representations) and the outcome (de-
fendants put to death).
Other empirical studies confirm the deep connection between me-
dia fact reporting and the propagation of racial stereotypes, findings
that call into question certain results of empirical studies relying on
media sources for case facts. 262 Several studies have found that televi-
sion news overrepresents the criminality of African Americans.263
Travis Dixon and Daniel Linz researched television news in the
greater Los Angeles area and compared news media coverage with
crime statistics.264 The researchers aggregated television news cover-
age from several different channels, and undertook a systematic cod-
ing scheme designed to measure the portrayal of perpetrators based
upon race. 265 They found that African Americans and Latinos were
portrayed as lawbreakers, but that European Americans were por-
trayed as defenders of the law. When looking only at portrayal of
perpetrators in felonies, such as murder, African Americans were al-
most two-and-a-half times more likely to be portrayed as felons than
Whites.266 Importantly, the overrepresentation of African Americans
as perpetrators existed even when accounting for arrest rates. 267 For
example, African Americans were portrayed as felons forty-four per-
cent of the time, but accounted for only twenty-five percent of felony
arrests.26
8
Other studies have found similar results. A study by Robert
Entman of local television in the Chicago area focused on the media's
260. Goff et al., supra note 185, at 302.
261. Id. at 304.
262. For a thorough discussion of how local news may serve to propagate racial bias, see
Kang, supra note 2.
263. Travis L. Dixon & Daniel Linz, Overrepresentation and Underrepresentation of African
Americans and Latinos as Lawbreakers on Television News, 50 J. COMM. 131, 132 (2000).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 142.
267. Id. at 145.
268. Id. at 146.
[Vol. 58:599
2009] RACE, DEATH, AND THE COMPLICITOUS MIND 643
role in depicting African-American criminality.2 69 Entman's study,
which examined local news broadcasts over a fifty-five day period,
found that African Americans charged with crimes were more likely
than European Americans to be pictured "in the grip of a restraining
police officer" and less likely to be named.270 Another study by
Daniel Romer examined Philadelphia local news coverage and found
that African Americans were more likely to be pictured as perpetra-
tors than as victims. 271 Gilliam and Iyengar found that minorities ac-
counted for a disproportionately high fifty-nine percent of suspects in
violent crime cases reported by Los Angeles news stations from 1996
to 1997.272 In light of these studies, one might ask whether empirical
studies that rely on the media for case facts are unintentionally includ-
ing biased facts that serve to minimize or mask racial disparities.
Considered in the aggregate, social cognition research demonstrates
that implicit bias in case facts can skew statistical analysis in such a
way as to reduce or completely mask racial disparities. Because peo-
ple misremember information and retell stories in automatically stere-
otyped ways, one can hypothesize that murder summaries might
contain factual errors that systematically increase the reported culpa-
bility and aggravated nature of African-American defendants' crimes.
Such fact-based errors would ultimately mean that despite research-
ers' good faith attempt to "control for legitimate characteristics,"
studies might be misaligning statistically. Such a misalignment would,
as Baldus and colleagues acknowledged, reduce observed race-of-de-
fendant effects.273
IV. CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this Article is to demonstrate the potential for
interdisciplinary collaboration in law and social science that will help
locate and understand how racial biases manifest at various stages of
269. Robert M. Entman, Blacks in the News: Television, Modern Racism and Cultural Change,
69 JOURNALISM Q. 341 (1992).
270. Dixon & Linz, supra note 263, at 133 (citing Entman, supra note 269, at 351).
271. Daniel Romer et al., The Treatment of Persons of Color in Local Television News: Ethnic
Blame Discourse or Realistic Group Conflict?, 25 COMM. RES. 286, 294 (1998).
272. Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 203, at 562.
273. It must be noted that I am not an expert in the complex statistical models used by Baldus
and others. The purpose of this discussion is not to prove the absolute existence of error in some
of the most impressive interdisciplinary studies in history. Rather, the purpose of this discussion
is to advance a preliminary hypothesis grounded in social cognition theory that could help ex-
plain how even groundbreaking studies displaying massive societal inequality might even be
holding back the complete truth about racial discrimination in the death penalty. Perhaps an
understanding of social cognition in the context of these studies can help inform future method-
ology and statistical analysis.
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capital cases. The hypotheses proposed in this Article have theoreti-
cal grounding and empirical support and deserve further examination.
Yet, as is the nature of hypotheses, neither Death Penalty Priming
Hypothesis nor Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis has been tested em-
pirically. Thus, this Article urges caution in relying upon the accuracy
of these hypotheses until they have been explored more systemati-
cally. For this reason, it is premature to discuss meaningful solutions
to the potential problems discussed in this Article.274
However, a few concluding points should be made regarding the
continued need for interdisciplinary collaboration that combines law
and social science. Collaboration between legal scholars and social
scientists is needed now more than ever. 275 Despite tremendous col-
laborative successes in the capital context beginning in the 1970s, 276
avenues remain unexplored. Social cognition research in particular
provides opportunities to engage in thoughtful, targeted studies of va-
rious stages in the death penalty process. Research on priming, in ad-
dition to the particular hypothesis advanced in this Article, might
alone account for several novel hypotheses that have yet to be ex-
amined. In addition, many of the hypotheses previously asserted by
scholars of the death penalty have not yet been empirically ex-
plored. 277 The best hypotheses will likely come from advocates and
scholar-advocates engaged deeply in the struggle for racial justice in
criminal law and capital cases. The other articles in this Symposium
issue are therefore another great place to start.
274. Other projects discussing implicit bias in law have made a variety of arguments. These
arguments, applied to Death Penalty Priming Hypothesis, could range from debiasing strategies
to abolition of the death penalty. See generally Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, (arguing for "fair
measures"); Page, supra note 9; Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 6 (claiming that
the best solution is cultural change).
275. See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Culture, Cognitions, and Legal Decision-Making, in HAND-
BOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION ACROSS CULTURES 423, 423-39 (Richard M. Sorrentino
& Susumu Tamaguchi eds., 2008) (summarizing social cognition, cultural psychology, and dis-
cussing a variety of legal projects in these areas).
276. See, e.g., Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 137; BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra
note 3.
277. For example, many legal scholars have focused on potential "unconscious" bias by prose-
cutors. See Radelet & Pierce, supra note 242.
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